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In his article “The Usability Construct: A Dead End?”, Tractinsky (Human-Computer Interaction VOL 
[YEAR], PAGES) contends that for scientific research on usability to progress, the usability construct 
should be unbundled and replaced by well-defined constructs. This contention is presented as the 
conclusion that follows naturally from taking a scientist’s viewpoint on usability. Similar calls for 
definitive concepts – constructs in Tractinsky’s terminology – have been made in other scientific fields 
with concepts as ambiguous as that of usability. But counterarguments have also been presented.  
About half way through his 1954 article “What Is Wrong with Social Theory?” (in American 
Sociological Review), Blumer writes: “There still remains what I am forced to recognize as the most 
important question of all, namely whether definitive concepts are suited to the study of our empirical 
world.” Tractinsky never considers this question, except by acknowledging that people other than 
scientists may not need a definitive concept of usability. Blumer’s perspective, however, is 
unconditionally scientific. His reservations toward definitive concepts follow from the basic 
observation that concepts are abstractions over empirical instances with a distinctive, particular, and 
unique character: 
“In handling an empirical instance of a concept for purposes of study or analysis we do not, and 
apparently cannot meaningfully, confine our consideration of it strictly to what is covered by the 
abstract reference of the concept. We do not cleave aside what gives each instance its peculiar character 
and restrict ourselves to what it has in common with the other instances in the class covered by the 
concept. To the contrary, we seem forced to reach what is common by accepting and using what is 
distinctive to the given empirical stance. In other words, what is common (i.e. what the concept refers 
to) is expressed in a distinctive manner in each empirical instance and can be got at only by accepting 
and working through the distinctive expression.” 
To researchers in human-computer interaction, Blumer’s argument may evoke Suchman’s analysis 
of the role of plans in her 1987 book, Plans and Situated Actions. Just as plans are underspecified 
relative to the rich multiplicity of actual action, so concepts are underspecified relative to the rich 
multiplicity of the empirical instances they model. In both cases the underspecification is deliberate: 
Concepts and plans are abstractions devised to be applicable across a class of actual instances, each 
with its unique character. Unless concepts were underspecified, they would only apply to a single 
empirical instance. In that case the concept would not have the abstract character of a class, its very 
restricted scope would make it of little interest, and it could not be regarded a proper concept. A proper 
concept must bring multiple empirical instances together in a class with common distinguishing 
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features. What constitutes a concept is its classness. It is by representing classes of empirical instances 
that concepts fulfil their role as mediators between theoretical propositions and practical events. The 
classness is something beyond the definitive content of empirical instances and, thus, does not follow 
from them through some process of specification. That is, vagueness relative to the empirical instances 
is a defining characteristic of concepts. Aiming for definitive concepts does not eliminate this 
characteristic. In Blumer’s words, “the concept continues to be constituted by general sense or 
understanding and not by specification.” 
As an alternative to definitive concepts Blumer proposes what he termed sensitizing concepts, 
which “suggest directions along which to look.” That is, they give their users “a general sense of 
reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances” and lack the precise specification and 
measurement instruments that are the hallmark of definitive concepts. Paraphrasing Suchman, 
sensitizing concepts are resources for scientific analysis but do not in any strong sense specify 
empirical instances. They are open-ended and suggestive in acknowledgement of the need to work with 
and through the empirical instances to recognize what the concepts refer to. Definitive and sensitizing 
concepts are both attempts of mediating between theory and practice, but they represent opposing 
views on what such mediation should accomplish – on what work we want our concepts to do for us. 
A definitive concept of usability will employ clear definitions of attributes and provide validated 
instruments for measurement. These definitions and instruments seek to provide a precise a priori 
specification of what is common to the empirical instances that can be characterized with the concept 
of usability. By prescribing the attributes to look for, it becomes more likely that usability remains the 
same concept across its applications and that it measures the same quality of the use of a system. 
However, a definitive concept also entails a risk that usability research becomes a formal quest for 
conceptual precision at the expense of practical relevance, that characteristics consequential to the 
usability of empirical instances are rendered invisible because they are not among the common features 
that define the usability concept, or more generally that the a priori specification of the concept 
obscures the very thing we seek to understand. In addition, the usability concept will remain ambiguous 
in the sense that there will still be a need for interpretation and common sense in applying it to 
empirical instances. 
Conversely, a sensitizing concept of usability will recognize that what we are referring to by this 
concept comes about in a different way in each empirical instance. The definition of usability in ISO 
standard 9241 (Part 210) provides an example. In this standard usability is defined as the “extent to 
which a system, product or service can be used by specified users to achieve specified goals with 
effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified context of use.” Only when the users, their 
goals, and the context of use are known can we start to investigate how usability comes about. A 
sensitizing usability concept like this one seeks to guide researchers in appreciating the distinctiveness 
of the empirical instance, rather than to embalm the instance in the abstract framework of a definitive 
concept. What counts as satisfaction may differ drastically depending on, for example, whether the 
context of use is one of work or leisure; the ISO definition leaves this relationship unspecified and 
merely sensitizes the researcher to the users’ satisfaction in the concrete context of use. The risks 
associated with a sensitizing concept of usability include that its ambiguity may make it a blunt analytic 
instrument, that the concept takes on different meanings on different occasions, that cross-case 
comparison becomes hard, and more generally that conceptual and theoretical development yields to 
the analysis of individual instances. 
Blumer argues that for social theory to progress we need sensitizing concepts, not definitive 
concepts. It appears that this argument has been embraced most fully by qualitative research 
approaches such as grounded theory, see for example Bowen’s 2006 paper “Grounded Theory and 
Sensitizing Concepts” (in International Journal of Qualitative Methods). In contrast, Tractinsky points 
to the research on the technology acceptance model as an example from which to learn in the 
development of a definitive concept of usability. Such a usability concept will consist of a network of 
constructs with relations of quantified strength. I tend to concur with Blumer. My article about the 
“Images of Usability” (International Journal of Human-Computer Interaction, 2010) is an examination 
of usability from a sensitizing point of view. However, my principal aim in writing this commentary 
has been to argue that research on human-computer interaction, in general, and research on usability, in 
particular, need to consider carefully which kind of usability concept is more usable and useful for our 
research. Such considerations involve choosing, or striking a balance, between a priori specification of 
the features common to a class of empirical instances and reaching what is common by making sense 
of the distinctive characteristics of the individual empirical instance. To put it somewhat provocatively, 
a definitive concept of usability ultimately relies on the specification of common features, whereas a 
sensitizing concept of usability ultimately relies on the application of common sense. Rather than 
presuming that one kind of usability concept is superior to the other, usability researchers should heed 
the virtues and vices of both kinds of concept.  
Tractinsky thoroughly examines the usability concept from the point of view of definitive concepts. 
I look forward to the dialogue that his examination will spur about how to move forward with the 
concept of usability. 
 
